Well report No. RR-7113 · T5N · R15W · SEC 5 · filed October 14, 2026
Gas & LNGWell report
Hormuz Shock Cuts 20% of LNG Supply, Delays Glut to Late 2020s
Hormuz's closure cut 20% of global LNG supply; GlobalData says the glut is delayed, not dead, with a 199 bcm surplus peak due in 2029 and a 63 bcm shortfall by 2035.
Field notes
- De-facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz cut off around 20% of global LNG supply in 2026.
- Strikes on Ras Laffan on 18–19 March damaged two trains totalling 12.8 mtpa, roughly 17% of Qatar's export capacity.
- GlobalData's reference case shows the LNG surplus peaking at 199 bcm in 2029, with the market short by 63 bcm in 2035.
- 166 bcm of planned production in 13 countries lacks a sanctioned or FID-dated route to market.
- TTF averaged close to $16/Mbtu in Q2 2026, up 32% year on year, while Henry Hub fell.

By Priya Raman
The de-facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz cut off roughly 20% of global liquefied natural gas supply in early 2026. Strikes on Ras Laffan on 18–19 March compounded the damage, knocking out two trains (liquefaction units) with 12.8 million tonnes per annum of capacity — about 17% of Qatar's export capability. That is the hardest fact in GlobalData's first Gas Market Outlook. The report's verdict: the transit shock delays the coming LNG glut. It does not cancel it.
What actually happened to the trade map?
The market entered 2026 braced for a glut and got a transit shock instead. The global LNG business runs on two long-distance corridors. Asia-Pacific took 364 bcm of the 583 bcm traded in 2025 — roughly 62%. The Middle East shipped 113.4 bcm to Asia-Pacific, about 85% of its exports, mostly through Hormuz. North America, on the other side of the map, sent 105.5 bcm to Europe, around 60% of Europe's LNG imports.
Together the two corridors carry more than a third of world LNG trade. Close one, and Asian buyers start competing with Europe for cargoes from the other.
GlobalData's reference case puts the 2026 damage at a 98.7 bcm drop in Middle Eastern production. World supply grows by just 14.9 bcm against 37.7 bcm of notional demand growth. The apparent balance (the gap between production and demand on paper) tightens from 40.6 bcm to 17.8 bcm. The consultancy estimates 38–59 bcm of demand physically could not be served this year.
Prices tell the same story. The Title Transfer Facility, Europe's gas benchmark, averaged close to $16/Mbtu in the second quarter, up 32% year on year. Henry Hub fell over the same period. Why? US export capacity was already running at its ceiling. There was simply nothing left to flex.
When does the glut arrive — and when does it end?
From 2027, Gulf exports return and a record construction pipeline starts up: 281.3 mtpa of liquefaction capacity at construction or commissioning stage comes online by 2031, much of it in the US and Qatar. In the reference case, the apparent surplus peaks at 199 bcm in 2029. Then it closes fast. Demand rises 19.8% to 5.18 trillion cubic metres by 2035 and does not peak before 2035 in any of GlobalData's six scenarios. Once the dated construction pipeline runs out after 2030, the market is balanced in 2034 and short by 63 bcm in 2035.
The scenarios shift timing more than direction:
- Price Convergence: cheaper LNG pulls in demand; the surplus is gone by 2032.
- Fragmented Supply: delayed and cancelled projects leave the market short from 2029 — by 327 bcm in 2035.
- AI Boom: adds 86 bcm of demand by 2035; the balance turns negative from 2033.
- Accelerated Transition: the only scenario that keeps the market long throughout, removing 410 bcm of 2035 demand.
Every scenario but one ends the glut by the mid-2030s. Note what the report does not say: it never promises the surplus persists. A caveat follows every promise here, and it is usually about project slippage.
Is the constraint geology or infrastructure?
The 2035 deficit does not reflect a shortage of gas in the ground. GlobalData's asset-level model, run field by field, shows the world could produce 5.29 tcm in 2035 — enough to keep the market 103 bcm long in the Unconstrained Upstream case.
The difference is 166 bcm of planned production, across 13 countries, with no sanctioned or final investment decision (FID)-dated route to market. Most of it sits in new offshore provinces: Senegal, Tanzania, Mauritania, Guyana and Cyprus. The US faces the opposite problem. Its approved and FID-dated liquefaction needs roughly 400 bcm more gas in 2035 than US producers have yet committed to drill.
Takeaway: gas is there. The pipes, trains and permits to move it are not.
The watch item
The 2026 shock showed how much of the market rests on two corridors. The 2027–2033 surplus, GlobalData argues, is more likely to be worked off by cheaper LNG drawing in demand and by supply that slips or dies, than to persist. For the 2030s, two questions decide whether the market tips into deficit: whether export routes get sanctioned in the new provinces, and whether US upstream keeps pace with US liquefaction. Watch the FIDs in Dakar, Dar es Salaam and Georgetown. Then watch the Permian rig count.
via globaldata.com (Original)
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Senior reporter covering technology and product news in Oil and gas industry operations and markets at Rig & Refinery.
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